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H. THE JUSTICE MODEL APPLIED:
A NEW WAY TO HANDLE THE COMPLAINTS
OF CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY AWARDS
by J. Michael Keating, Jr.*
There was one additional right-the privilege of writing applications
and petitions (which replaced freedom of the press, of assembly, and of
the ballot, all of which we had lost when we left freedom). Twice a
month the morning duty officer asked: "Who wants to write a petition?" And they listed everyone who wanted to. In the middle of the
day they would lead you to an individual box and lock you up in it.
In there, you could write whomever you pleased: the Father of the Peoples, the Central Committee of the Party, the Supreme Soviet, Minister
Beria, Minister Abakumov, the General Prosecutor, the Chief Military
Prosecutor, the Prison Administration, the Investigation Department.
You could complain about your arrest, your interrogator, even the chief
of the prison! In each and every case your petition would have no effect
whatever. It would not be stapled into any file, and the most senior
official to read it would be your own interrogator. However, you were
in no position to prove this. In fact, it was rather more likely that he
would not read it, because no one would be able to read it. On a piece
of paper measuring seven by ten centimeters-in other words, three by
four inches-a little larger than the paper given you each morning at
the toilet, with a pen broken in the middle or bent into a hook, and an
inkwell with pieces of rag in it and ink diluted with water, you would just
be able to scratch out "Petit.. ." Then the letters would all run together
on the cheap paper, "ion" couldn't be worked into the line, and everything would come through on the other side of the sheet.'
Alexandr Solzhenitsyn
The Gulag Archipelago
I. INTRODUCTION

Arbitration, mediation, shared decision-making with wards, 2 and the
* A.B., 1960 (Holy Cross College); M.A., 1963 (New York University); J.D., 1973
(Georgetown University). Deputy Director of the Center for Correctional Justice.
1. A. SorzHENrrsYN, ThE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 208-09 (1973).
2. Inmates in the California Youth Authority are referred to as "wards." The age
group supervised by the California Youth Authority is comparable to inmates sentenced
under the Federal Youth Corrections Act. 18 U.SC. § 5005 et seq. (1970). The
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provision of a just system for dealing with the grievances of wards:
These are the fundamental concepts in a program launched in 1972

to create a radically new way of handling grievances in the California
Youth Authority (CYA). Based on principles and concepts never before applied in corrections, the CYA has established grievance procedures for wards in every one of its institutions, forestry camps, reception centers and community programs. In addition, it 'has recently
instituted similar experimental procedures in selected parole units to
provide an avenue of redress for parolees with grievances.
The experimental grievance procedure, which now has become an

institutionalized part of the overall California Youth Authority program, is the result of a lengthy and fruitful collaboration between the

CYA and the Center for Community Justice (the Center), a Washington, D.C. organization long involved in the design, implementation and
evaluation of correctional grievance mechanisms. 3 The Center made
early and extended use of the skills of organizations with established
expertise in mediation and arbitration, including particularly the Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution (the Institute) 4 and the
American Arbitration Association (the AAA).5
California Youth Authority accepts commitments to age 20 and retains jurisdiction of
committed youths to age 25.
3. The Center was founded in 1971 with a grant from the Office of Legal Services
of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to design and operate a model legal services program for prisoners and to develop administrative inmate grievance procedures.
Since then, the Center has received research and technical assistance grants from both
the federal government (National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration) and private foundations (Rosenberg
Foundation of California, Ford Foundation, Polaroid Foundation, the Eugene and Agnes
E. Meyer Foundation of Washington, D.C.).
4. The Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution, a New York City-based organization, was established in 1970 with funding assistance from the Ford Foundation to
work in the area of community disputes primarily in New York City. Founded by
Theodore W. Kheel and currently headed by Basil A. Paterson, the Institute has trained
over 250 community and governmental leaders from all across the country in negotiation
and mediation skills and has conducted training courses for various arms of government
on the national, state and local levels.
5. The American Arbitration Association (hereinafter referred to as AAA) is a public service membership corporation, founded in 1926, that predominates in the field of
arbitration. It maintains a labor panel of arbitrators of over 1800 persons and annually
administers over 25,000 arbitration cases. In addition, it conducts a wide range of
activities designed to publicize and promote the use of arbitration in a wide variety of
contexts. The Community Dispute Service (formerly the National Center for Dispute
Settlement or NCDS) was created by the AAA in 1968 to develop the use of mediation,
fact-finding and arbitration in community disputes. Both the AAA and the former
NCDS provided assistance to the California Youth Authority in establishing its grievance
procedure.
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II.
BACKGROUND: THE IMPROVING CLIMATE FOR THE
ADMINISTRATIVE REDRESS OF PRISONERS' GRIEVANCES

Investigations following most major prison disturbances have generally acknowledged the existence of legitimate inmate complaints directed at conditions, policies or personnel of the besieged prison. Consider, for example, the record in just one state. In its explanation of
the Attica riot, the McKay Commission pointed to the longstanding and
uncorrected prevalence of conditions that led to the tragic events of
September, 1971.8 Within months of the release of the Attica report,
investigation of a troubled county correctional facility on Long Island,
conducted by undercover agents of the local district attorney, similarly
recorded the explosive frustration of inmates unable to get responses
to their legitimate complaints. 7 In November, 1975, Mayor Abraham
Beame of New York City granted amnesty to rioting prisoners at the
City's Rikers Island institution after acknowledging the legitimacy of
the grievances that generated the disturbance."
Repeatedly, rioting prisoners argue that no one listens to their complaints or that, once heard, their grievances are ignored. Although recognizing that they may be hurt the most by their violence, they continue to endanger their lives and the lives of others in protest. Yet,
there is a certain logic to the violence of prisoners; each new outbreak
that wrings concessions from suddenly responsive officials is an inspiration to inmates elsewhere. The spiralling human and material costs
of this violent approach to prisoners' grievances are becoming increasingly evident to local government officials, correctional administrators,
and the general public. 9
6. The Commission specifically condemned inadequate medical care, food and recreational facilities; "barriers to all forms of communication with the outside world"; rules
that were "poorly communicated, often petty, senseless, or repressive and . . . selectively
enforced"; and a relationship between more correctional officers and inmates that was

"characterized by fear, hostility, and mistrust, nurtured by racism." NEw YoRK STATE
SPECIAL CoImzssION ON ATIcA, ATTICA:

THE OFmciAL REPORT OF TEE NEW YoRuK

STATE SPECIAL ComissIoN ON ATSCA 54-80 (1972).
7. The report stated:

When an inmate had a complaint or a grievance, he felt that he had no recourse

within the prison system. If he wrote a complaint to a high-ranking officer or the
warden, it had to be submitted, unsealed, to the guard on duty-who often was the

very individual against whom the complaint was made. Most inmates believed that
their complaints never reached the staff members to whom they were addressed and

that a written complaint was an exercise in futility. Many of them did not submit
complaints because they feared they would. .. suffer loss of "good time" (the time
deducted from their original sentence for good behavior).
Cahn, Report on the Nassau County Jail, 19 CSEME & DELiNQUENCY 1, 11 (1973).

8. N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1975, at 37, col. 3.

,

9. See, e.g., SOUTH CAROLiNA DEPT. OF ConnEcTioNs CoLLEcnvE VIOLENCE RE-
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The existence and importance of the breakdown in meaningful communication of grievances between nmates and prison administrators has
been noted and lamented by a wide variety of penal experts, most of

whom credit the breakdown with a major role in recurring disturbances.

10

One indirect effect of successful resort to violence on the part of prisoners is the discouragement of inmate initiative in fashioning legitimate, non-violent means of expressing discontent and seeking re11
form.
Increasing violence has not been the only incentive for the creation
of effective administrative grievance mechanisms in prisons. Beginning in the mid-1960's, courts began to abandon the "hands-off" doctrine which had long been applied to prisoners' claims.' 2 While subSEARCH PRojECr, CoLLECrIVE VIOLENCE

IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS-A

SEARCH

FOR CAUSES (1973); Singer & Keating, Prisoner Grievance Mechanisms: A Better Way
titan Violence, Litigation, and Unlimited Administrative Discretion, 19 CRIME & DELINQuENcY 367 (1973).
10. See, e.g., AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, CAUSES, PREVENTTI=V MEASURES, AND METHODS OF CONTROLLING RIOTS AND DISTURBANCES IN CORRECTIONAL INSTI-

TunONS 66 (1970):
The riots result, we believe, not from bad prison conditions or practices but from
the belief of prison inmates that the only way in which they can gain public interest
in improving such conditions is by rioting. Nonviolent protests or requests for remedial action, prisoners believe, never accomplish anything. Riots sometimes do.
Id. quoting CImSTIAN CENTURY, vol. 72, at 884.
In a perceptive study of collective violence in prisons, Edith Flynn, Ph.D., Associate
Director of the National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture,
listed as one of the major contributing factors in the recent wave of correctional violence: "absent or restricted communication patterns which seriously impair the airing
of legitimate inmate grievances and the detection of impending unrest." FLYNN, Sources
of Collective Violence in CorrectionalInstitutions, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MONOGRAPH:

PREVENTION OF

VIOLENCE IN CORRECTIONAL INSTrrUTIONS 15, 28 (1973).

11. One articulate prisoner observed:
While displaying our displeasure in a manner we thought lawfully appropriate (exercising our right not to work was deemed lawful a long time ago), things have
been taking place that make us wonder indeed if orderly expression is the answer,
as opposed to disorderly destruction and violence, which never fail to draw quick
attention and widespread news coverage.
The Prison Strike: A Peaceful Alternative, Fortune News, April, 1973, at 7. The Fortune news is a monthly newspaper of The Fortune Society, an organization of ex-convicts and other interested persons located in New York City.
12. Justification both for the "hands-off" doctrine and its abandonment is summarized
succinctly in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974):
[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of
Moreover, where state penal institutions
prison administration and reform ....
are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate
prison authorities.
But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance
of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When
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sequent years yielded some important legal victories that have expanded substantially prisoners' rights, the overall impact of judicial intervention has been disappointing.
Part of the disillusionment stems from the length of time and resource commitment required to pursue a case through the courts. Litigation efforts to bring change to the Arkansas prison system illustrates
the point. In a series of decrees in 1969 and 1970, a federal district
judge ordered the wholesale revamping of the Arkansas correctional
system. 13 Yet, after five years of litigation, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion handed down in November, 1974, confirmed the fact that conditions in Arkansas correctional institutions continued to be unconstitutional in many aspects and
that Arkansas was in substantial non-compliance with the original judicial decrees.' 4
Another element in the growing disillusionment among prisoners
and reformers is the limited subject matter jurisdiction of judicial review. Departures from the "hands-off" doctrine come reluctantly, and
as the Supreme Court indicated in Procunierv. Martinez," judicial intervention was designed only to protect constitutional rights. The discretion of correctional administrators remains incredibly broad.
From the beginning of increased judicial activism, correctional administrators have been unhappy with court intervention as a means of
achieving reform. Part of the unhappiness arises, no doubt, because
responding in court to prisoners' complaints is both time-consuming and
expensive. Another factor is the conviction, long prevalent among administrators, that courts have no special expertise qualifying them
to
dictate or oversee the implementation of change in corrections.
The courts themselves have taken great pains to assure administrators that they have no desire to intervene in the day-to-day operations
of correctional institutions. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger relates
a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.
Id. at 405-06. See also Gifis, Decision Making in a Prison Community, 1974 WIs. L.
RaV. 349, 353.
13. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp.
825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
14. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1974). Attorneys in the Holt case and its progeny were awarded modest legal fees along the fiveyear course of litigation. Under the Supreme Court's ruling last term in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975), it is no longer clear
whether attorneys representing prisoners in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970) will be entitled to fees.

15. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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with obvious dismay the case of a prisoner who engaged the primary
attention of "one District Judge twice, three Circuit Judges on appeal,
and six others in a secondary sense-to say nothing of lawyers, court
clerks, bailiffs, court reporters, and all the rest"' in an attempt to recover
seven packs of cigarettes allegedly taken improperly by a guard.'
Other judges have echoed the Chief Justice's desire to set limits on
use of the judicial process as a means for resolving the broad gamut
of prisoners' complaints. In November, 1974, the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit cited cases brought before federal
judges that were characterized as totally inappropriate for the exercise
of judicial intervention. Examples given included the claimed right to
keep a pet in a correctional institution, the right of an inmate to receive
personal clothing from the state and the duty of the institution to repair
broken toiletsY
The subject matter of cases brought by prisoners-particularly to
federal courts-is one source of judicial vexation. Far more critical,
however, is the ever-rising volume of petitions being filed by prisoners.
In his latest annual report on the judiciary, the Chief Justice announced
that one-sixth of all cases on the civil dockets of federal courts are petiended his observations on the problem of
tions from prisoners. 18 He ene
prisoner petitions with a refrain he has often sounded in the past:
Federal judges should not be dealing with prisoner complaints which,
although important to a prisoner, are so minor that any well-run institution should be able to resolve them fairly without resort to federal
judges.' 9
The common element tying together the complaints of most judicial
critics of the growing recourse to courts by prisoners is the recommendation that correctional administrators move promptly to create viable,
credible administrative alternatives. 20 In some jurisdictions where ad16. Address by Chief Justice Burger delivered to American Bar Association, Washington, D.C., Aug. 6, 1973. The case referred to by the Chief Justice is Russell v. Bodner,
478 F.2d 1399 (3rd Cir. 1973).
17. Sparks v. Fuller, 506 F.2d 1238 (1st Cir. 1974).
18. Burger, Chief Justice Burger Issues Yearend Report, 62 A.B.A.J. 189 (1976).
19. Id. at 190. Of the 117,000 cases filed in the fiscal year, 19,000 represented petitions from prisoners, including habeas corpus petitions.
20. Among these critics is Chief Justice Burger who, in a speech delivered to the
National Conference of Christians and Jews at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Nov. 16,
1972, said:
This, in essence, is what every penal institution must have-the means of having
complaints reach decisionmaking sources through established channels so that the
valid grievances can be remedied and spurious grievances exposed.
Another critic is Judge Donald P. Lay of the United States Court of Appeals for the
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ministrative grievance mechanisms have been introduced, courts have

been quick to grant approval and encouragement. In a recent case denying Connecticut prisoners the right to form a union, a federal district
judge described the newly established ombudsman program as providing ample opportunity for the presentation of inmates' grievances for
review by an objective outside body.21

In a little-noted 1974 decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, the court suggested strong approval for the re-

quirement offered by the newly implemented and then experimental
Federal Bureau of Prisons grievance procedure and imposed by a district
court that federal prisoners exhaust administrative channels for remedy

of grievances before submitting their petitions to the lower court. 22

In a similar case, McCray v. Burrell,2 8 another federal district judge

ordered state prisoners in Maryland to exhaust their administrative
remedies through the Inmate Grievance Commission, established by
statute in 1971, before bringing cases to the federal courts. The United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court
with some obvious regret:
We keenly appreciate the force of the factors identified by the district
court in McCray . . . as supporting a policy determination that exhaustion of available administrative remedies should be required of
prisoners of correctional institutions in Maryland as a prerequisite to
a suit under § 1983. We recognize the burden which the increasing
flood of prisoner complaint litigation places upon the already overtaxed district courts as well as ourselves. Nevertheless, we are constrained to conclude that the holding that exhaustion is required may be
Eighth Circuit. This court has reviewed three of the major correctional decisions of
the past five years: Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
Judge Lay has stated:
Mhe second and perhaps more immediate solution to many of our problems is to
create within the prison system an administrative grievance adjustment policy which
will be attractive to the prison population. As prisoners come to realize that their
complaints will be processed on an administrative level in a fair, expeditious and
impartial manner, and that relief will be afforded where justified, inmates will begin
to elect their administrative remedy rather than the delayed process of the courts.
RFSOLUTION OF CoRREenoNAL PROBLEMS Am IssuEs, Fall 1974, at 10 (published by the
South Carolina Department of Corrections).
21. Paka v. Manson, 387 F. Supp. 111, 117 (D. Conn. 1974).
22. Ross v. Henderson, 491 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1974). Recently, Chief Justice Burger
suggested the possibility that the Federal Bureau of Prisons administrative grievance procedure may have contributed to the moderation in the annual rate of increase of prisoners' petitions from federal prisoners in the preceding fiscal year. Burger, Chief Justice
Burger Issues Yearend Report, 62 A.B.A.J. 189, 190 (1976).
23. 367 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Md. 1973), rev'd, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975).
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reached only by either legislation conditioning resort to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 upon the exhaustion of available administrative remedies, or by
the Supreme Court's re-examination and modification of its controlling
adjudications on the subject. Congress has not enacted such legislation. The Supreme Court has not yet begun a re-examination of its
previous holdings and we have no basis on which to predict that it
will, or, if so, with what result. We think that we have no alternative
but to hold that exhaustion may not be required. 24
On November 3, 1975, the Supreme Court granted certioiari and
agreed to hear the Burrell case. 25 The Court's agreement to hear the
case undoubtedly reflects growing concern about the volume of prisoners' petitions submitted to federal courts. This concern may well lead
to the imposition of an exhaustion requirement where adequate administrative procedures for redress of grievances exist. Any such requirement should be accompanied by specific standards for timeliness and
adequacy; otherwise, the least common denominator among the many
currently available and largely ineffective grievance mechanisms is
likely to become the norm.
While the search for alternatives to violence and litigation has done
much to foster interest in administrative grievance mechanisms, a more
positive influence, the so-called "justice model," has emerged recently
to promote development of these mechanisms. The justice model is
a by-product of growing disillusionment with the "rehabilitative ideal,"
a conceptual framework that has dominated corrections for most of the
twentieth century.20 The central element of the justice model, which
is still in its infancy as a unifying rationalization of overall correctional
policy, is an emphasis on the importance of fairness and equity both
27
in correctional policies and in their application.
One active correctional administrator who subscribes to the "justice
model" approach to corrections is Allen F. Breed, former Director of
24. McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 360-61 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. improvidently
granted, 423 U.S. 923 (1975).
25. 423 U.S. 923 (1975).
26. For a discussion of the "rehabilitative ideal," see Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal
Values, and the RehabilitativeIdeal, 50 J. CaIM. LC. & P.S. 226 (1960).
27. The philosophical basis for the model has been provided by I. RAWLS, A TaoRy
oF JusTIcE (1971) in which the English philosopher urges the primacy of justice:
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.
A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue;
likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be
reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.

Id. at 3.
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the California Youth Authority. He frequently cites the need for an
atmosphere of justice in correctional institutions as one of the main reasons he became interested in the introduction of a grievance mechanism in the CYA. He asserts:
"that ...we believe in fairness... and we ought to be demonstrating
it in those areas that govern the greatest part of the kid's life-his
everyday activities and i[his] interaction with staff."
"No treatment program that exists . . .today in the field of corrections [is] successful, and, basically, they are not successful because they
are operated in an environment that's not fair . . ."28
Recognition of the need for grievance mechanisms designed to provide fair and effective review of inmates' grievances has come from
within, 29 as well as from without the corrections establishment.3 0 The
response of correctional administrators to this need has engendered one

of the most innovative and promising developments in corrections in
28. R. &T. Denenberg, Prison Grievance Procedures, CORRECTIONS MAGAZINE 29, 41
(Jan./Feb. 1975).
29. One source states:
Prompt and positive handling of inmates' complaints and grievances is essential in
maintaining good morale. A firm "no" answer can be as effective as granting his
request in reducing an individual inmate's tensions, particularly if he feels his problem has been given genuine consideration by appropriate officials and if given a
reason for the denial. Equivocation and vague answers create false hopes and thus
increase the man's anger when nothing is done. A most dangerous situation arises
however when inmates have grievances they feel can be corrected if only the proper
officials are made aware of their problems. Inmates know that disturbances are
certain to give their complaints wide publicity when less drastic measures fail.
AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, CAUSES, PREVENTITIVE MEASURES, AND METHODS
OF CONTROLLING RIOTS AND DISTURBANCES IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 23

30. See

NATIONAL

ADVISORY

COMMISSION

ON

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

(1970).

STANDARDS

AND

GOALS, CORRECTIONS (1973), which states:
A formal procedure to insure that offenders' grievances are fairly resolved should
alleviate much of the existing tension within institutions ....
Peaceful avenues
for redress of grievances are a prerequisite if violent means are to be avoided. Thus
all correctional agencies have not only a responsibility but an institutional interest
in maintaining procedures that are, and appear to offenders to be, designed to resolve their complaints fairly.
Id. at 57. See also THE ACADEMY FOR CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, THE GROUP FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF CORRECTIONS, TOWARD A NEW CORRECTIONS POLICY:

TWO DEcLARATHE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY,
FOR THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF PRISONERS IV-51 (1972); FOURTH

TIONS OF PRINCIPLES 10

A

MODEL

AcT

(1974);

UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON PREVENTION OF CRIME AND TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS,

Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1955) in COMPENDIUM OF
MODEL CORRECTIONAL LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS, Rule 36 at IV-II (2d ed. 1972);
PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION

ON LAW

ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 13
SEMBLY, PRISONERS IN AMERICA 8 (1972).

(1967);

OF JUSTICE,

REPORT OF THE 42ND AMERICAN As-
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recent times, a development that may have profound impact on the
broader field of administrative law.
ImI.

INITIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NON-JUDICIAL
GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS

The need to avoid violence and litigation and the need to promote
justice in the correctional system have become basic assumptions in many
jurisdictions. Given the requirement for constructing a means for the
communication and consideration of grievances, correctional administrators have responded in a wide variety of ways. Some have chosen to do
nothing more than rely on existing informal means for resolving grievances without creating additional mechanisms. This approach has now
been rejected by most administrators who have tried at least one formal mechanism; many have attempted the simultaneous introduction
3
of several formal mechanisms. 1

Formal mechanisms fall into three broad categories: so-called ombudsman programs, multi-leveled procedures and inmate councils. While
legal services programs for inmates also provide a means for dealing

with a certain class of prisoners' problems, they do not themselves constitute a grievance mechanism. They are. an important and useful
supplement to an institution's grievance mechanism, but their limited
jurisdiction precludes their use as a substitute.

One other means for

dealing with inmates grievances, promoted actively in some states, is a
prisoners' union. Official recognition of an inmate organization as a bargaining agent presumably would entail development of a contract which
would include a procedure for handling disputes arising under the
agreement.32 The prisoners' union movement, however, is still in its
infancy and as yet does not provide a viable means of dealing with the

complaints of inmates. 3

31. See McArthur, Inmate Grievance Mechanisms: A Survey of 209 American Prisons,, 38 FEDERAL PROBATION 41 (Dec. 1974) [hereinafter cited as McArthur], for a
survey of correctional grievance mechanisms.
32. Under public employment statutes in at least three states inmate organizations
have sought recognition, with little success, as bargaining agents for prisoners. See In
re Walpole Chapter of the National Prisoners' Association, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission, Case No. SCRX-2 (Sept. 24, 1973); In re Prisoners' Labor Union at Marquette and Prisoners' Labor Union at Jackson, Michigan Employment Relations Commission, Case Nos. R72 E-163, C72 E-81, R72 F-214, C72 F108 (March 19, 1974); In re State of New York (Dep't of Correctional Serv.) and
Prisoners' Labor Union at Green Haven, 5 N.Y. PuB. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 3D
5-4040, at 4068 (1972).
33. The California Prisoners' Union recently concluded eight months of negotiations
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Inmate Councils

Inmate councils have been popular in correction for some time.84
The term has been applied broadly to any sort of inmate organization,
generally operated by elected inmate representatives, which attempts
to resolve general problems at regular meetings with institutional or
departmental administrators, who retain final decision-making power.
This method is perhaps best known nationally through publicity given
to the Resident Government Council at Washington State Penitentiary
(Walla Walla).-" Applications of this method have a common characteristic: a lack of credibility among the inmate population. One
major factor contributing to the general lack of credibility of inmate
councils is the repeated sublimation of the difference in objectives of
administrators and inmate participants in a typical council. Inmates
initially tend to view the council as a vehicle for change, which provides
them with a direct and powerful voice. Administrators generally have
a more limited view of the purpose of a council, seeing its role more
narrowly as a sounding board for inmates' complaints about institutional
36
policies.
with the California Department of Corrections which resulted in a "proposal" allowing
California's 20,000 adult prison inmates to organize and form the equivalent of a labor
union, if accepted by the department and the State. Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1976,
§ A, at 34, col. 4. Opposition to the proposal, led by the California Correctional Officers Association, has been vociferous and effective.
34. For review of the development of inmate institutions of self-government in pris-

ons,

see MURTON, SHARED DEcIsIoN-MAKING AS A TREATMENT TECHNIQUE IN PRISON

MANAGEMENT

7-63 (1975).

As early as 1966, the American Correctional Association was encouraging the adoption of inmate councils:
One of the most significant privileges which can be extended to persons confined
is opportunity to take some limited responsibility for the planning and operation
of the institution program. Opportunity for participation in constructive social action while under custody, usually in the form of an inmate advisory council, can
be one of the most successful and effective means for developing high institutional
morale and good discipline.
MANuAL OF ConECn0NAL STANDARDS 547 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
See also SoUTH CAROLINA DEPT. OF CoRRECTIONS, THE EMERGING RIrHTS OF THE CONFINED 94

(1972).

35. The Walla Walla inmate government was the subject of a major article in one
of Life Magazine's final issues. LIFn, Sept. 8, 1972, at 32. As of April 1, 1975, however, the Resident Government Council at Walla Walla had been disbanded.
36. See, e.g., MANUAL, supranote 34. The MANUAL states:
The inmate advisory council's functions always remain advisory. No actual administrative powers are ever delegated to it. The council encourages, develops, and supports projects for the general welfare of inmates, but all responsibility for management remains in the hands of regularly employed personnel.
Id. at 458.
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Regardless of how one evaluates the effectiveness of inmate councils,
they make a poor substitute for a grievance procedure. Characteristically, they do not handle individual complaints; rarely are there time
limits within which responses must be made; frequently, there is no requirement for a response at all. 8 7 While inmate councils, where effective, may enhance communication between inmates and administration
and provide a useful supplement to a functioning grievance procedure,
they cannot be counted on to handle the daily problems of prison life
that are the major concern of an institutional grievance mechanism.
B.

Ombudsman Programs

One of the most widespread of correctional grievance mechanisms is
the ombudsman. The concept, first implemented in Sweden in 1809
and successfully adopted in other Scandinavian countries, calls for the
appointment, usually by the legislature, of an independent and respected
individual to handle the complaints of citizens against governmental
agencies. s Generally, an ombudsman has broad investigatory powers.
When he determines that a complaint is valid, he usually recommends
a resolution to the agency involved. If the agency ignores the recommendation, the ombudsman is authorized to report directly to the legislative body that appointed him. Since the ombudsman also has the
authority to make his findings and recommendations public, government
agencies theoretically face considerable pressure to comply with his
recommendations. The ombudsman can only recommend action; he
cannot enforce his own findings. 89
Adaptations of the ombudsman concept in America have deviated
from the Scandinavian model. Nowhere has the deviation been as pro37. This listing of problems is only partial; other problems include the questionable
applicability of representative government in correctional institutions, see PREsmENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW EFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CoRRECTIoNs 13 (1967), and the historic impermanence of councils, see Singer
and Keating, Prisoner Grievance Mechanisms, 9 CanM & DELINQUENCY 367, 371
(1973).
38. For a general study of the ombudsman concept see S. ANDERSON, OmnuDsMm
mrmNT? (1968); W. GEL.HORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN
FOR, AMm CAN GovmE
(1966).
39. OMBUDSMAN COMMIrE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASsOCIATION SECTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw, MODEL OMBUDSMAN

STATUTE FOR STATE GOVERNMENTS

(1974) pro-

vides an exemplar for a well-constructed ombudsman statute. The same organization also
publishes a listing (with periodic updates) of both international and United States ombudsman and ombudsman-like programs, the latest of which is: OMBUDSMAN COMMITTEE OF THE AmERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECrION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, OMBUDSMAN
SURVEY JULY 1, 1974-UNE 30, 1975.
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nounced as in corrections. 40 -Most so-called correctional "ombudsman"
programs are more closely akin to the inspector general prototype of
the military services than the Scandinavian model. Frequently the ombudsman is an employee of the institution or department he is supposed
to monitor. 41 He is generally removable at the whim of the appointing
authority. 42 Rarely is -acorrectional ombudsman permitted to make his
recommendations public.43

Another critical shortcoming of correctional adaptations of the ombudsman program is the scope of jurisdiction. An ombudsman was
never intended to take the place of an administrative system for handling complaints; rather, it was conceived as a supplement to such a
system. As one experienced Scandinavian ombudsman has observed:
The institution of Ombudsman will never be a substitute for such elementary safeguards as judicial control, internal control, and an administrative appellate system. It will always be a factor of additional guaranthe Omtee. If the ordinary remedies do not function satisfactorily,
44
budsman will be paralyzed by an overwhelming work-load.

Yet an ombudsman, coupled with a grievance procedure, can monitor the effectiveness of the procedure, as well as undertake investiga-

tions on his own initiative.
C.

Structured Multi-Level Grievance Procedures

Despite the appealing novelty of the ombudsman concept, most correctional systems have relied on a structured procedure involving the
40. For a review of the early development in corrections of an ombudsman, see Tibbles, Ombudsmen for American Prisons, 48 N. DAKOTA L. Rav. 383 (1972). See also,
May, PrisonOmbudsmen in America, CoRRtcTroNs MAGAZINE, Jan./Feb. 1975, at 45.
41. See, e.g., Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Correction, Administrative Reg. 847
(1972). After little more than two years of operation the Ohio ombudsman program
was terminated in early 1975. Cited as principal reason for the termination was the
fact that inmates used the ombudsman to bypass local management personnel with their
problems, thereby circumventing institutional review of grievances where most problems
. I
could be resolved most efficiently and effectively.
42. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.41 (Supp. 1976). The Minnesota Correctional
Ombudsman is appointed by and serves, at the pleasure of the governor. There are no
clear statutory guidelines on causes for removal.
43. Only in Iowa is a purely correctional ombudsman authorized to publicize his rejected recommendations for the resolution of a specific grievance. IowA CODE ANN. §
601G.17 (1975). Elsewhere, the ombudsman may be authorized to publish an annual
report, which can include rejected recommendations.
44. Bexelius, The Origin, Nature, and Functions of the Civil and Military Ombudsman in Sweden, 377 ANNALS 10, 18 (1968). Mr. Bexelius served for twelve years as
Sweden's ombudsman.
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processing of complaints through institutional, departmental and, occasionally, independent levels of review.4 5 Major differences between the
ombudsman and a formal grievance procedure include the following: In
a grievance procedure, the burden of pursuing a resolution through the
various levels falls on the grievant. In an ombudsman program, once a
complaint is filed, the grievant's role ends. A grievance procedure gives
local administrators an opportunity to resolve local problems, without
immediate recourse to individuals outside the administrative chain of
command, while most ombudsman programs direct problems immediately to the department or independent individual acting as the ombudsman.
Like ombudsman programs, grievance procedures come in a wide
variety of formats. Some are completely internal;4 6 others involve outside review in some form;' 7 others encourage inmate participation in
the operation of the procedure;4 s some procedures have relatively tight
time limits; 49 and some are virtually open-ended. °
IV.

THE CENTER FOR COMMUNITY JUSTICE AND ITS EARLY

DEVELOPMENT OF A GRIEVANCE

PROCEDURE FOR CORRECTIONS

In late 1970, a group of attorneys, ex-offenders and correctional officials founded the Center for Correctional Justice, a private, tax-exempt
organization, to seek new ways to deal with prisoners' grievances. Out
of the Center's operational experience and research efforts, a new
model for correctional grievance mechanisms emerged. This model
became the prototype for the CYA grievance procedure.
As its first project, funded by a demonstration grant from the Office
of Economic Opportunity's Office of Legal Services, the Center designed
and operated a pilot program for delivering legal services to prisoners
and parolees in the District of Columbia. Through their presence in
local institutions as independent outsiders, Center staff members came
45. Of 209 responding correctional institutions in one survey, 77 percent said that
they had "a formal procedure for handling grievances of inmates." McArthur, supra
note 31, at 43.
46. See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 2001.6A (Oct. 18, 1974).
47. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F (Supp. 1975) for a description of the
Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission.
48. See, e.g., Wis. Dept. of Health and Social Services, Division of Corrections,
Inmate Complaint Review System (Jan. 31, 1973).
49. E.g., Federal Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 2001.6A (Oct. 18, 1974).
50. E.g., Cal. Dept. of Corrections, Administrative Bulletin No. 73/49 (Oct. 17,
1973).
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to serve as ad hoc ombudsmen, mediating disputes between inmates and
correctional staff in areas such as medical treatment, mail censorship,
transfers, and disciplinary rules and procedures. 51
As a result of this early practical experience, Center staff members
developed several hypotheses. One was that a formal procedure obligating administrators to respond in writing within prescribed time limits to prisoners' complaints provided the only means of avoiding endless
delays during which officials promised to "look into" or "take care of"
problems but never actually delivered definite responses. Second, inmates themselves, as opposed to prison staff or even well-meaning outsiders, had to be given major responsibility for defining and resolving
their own complaints. Center staff observed that a large portion of inmates with whom they came in contact had spent most of their lives
in one sort of institution or another. As true children of the state, they
had been fed, clothed and regimented by the state and had little experience in dealing constructively with their own problems. Finally, although solutions to institutional problems could best be developed by
those who must live with them, namely inmates and prison staff, there
would be little motivation on the part of staff to compromise differences
with inmates as long as the only appeal by inmates from rejection of
complaints was to the system itself. Some review of decisions on grievances by someone independent of the correctional system was required.
With these hypotheses in mind, -the Center began development in
mid-1972 of a correctional grievance procedure based on research into
similar mechanisms in other contexts. After a review of complaint
handling procedures in government, schools, military and industry, the
Center focused further study on grievance procedures in labor relations. At about the same time, the Center, along with the National
Center for Dispute Settlement and the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency, co-sponsored a Washington, D.C. conference on prison
violence which brought together labor union leaders, correctional administrators, ex-offenders, arbitrators, mediators and correctional reformers. In addition to considering ways of dealing with violent crises,
the conference wrestled with the problem of creating permanent, pre51. In 1973, the Center turned over its pilot legal services program for inmates to
the Washington, D.C. Public Defenders Service. One of the premises of the pilot project
was that prisoners were generally ignored by existing legal services organizations, which
ought to be more cognizant of and responsive to prisoner-clients. The willingness of
the D.C. Public Defenders Service to assume continuing responsibility for the program
was a vindication of that premise. The Center has provided technical assistance to other
private groups around the country interested in establishing similar prisoner legal services programs.
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ventive means of handling conflict in corrections.5" In this regard, the
conference provided an opportune forum for the Center to explain and
obtain expert critique of its hypoetheses and early design efforts. Finally, the meeting brought together people with diverse kinds of expertise who eventually were to contribute substantially to the CYA procedure.
In late 1972, the Center was invited by John 0. Boone, Commissioner of Correction in Massachusetts, to develop a grievance procedure for the Concord Reformatory. What the Washington conference
had accomplished in refining and sharpening design aspects of the procedure, the Massachusetts experience was to accomplish for the implementation phase of the procedure. With little more than an introduction to the institutional administration by the Commissioner, the Center
plunged directly into the task of implementing the procedure it had designed to the last detail in its Washington, D.C. office.
After one or two sessions with inmates and staff, it became clear that
the imposition of a design prefabricated elsewhere by outsiders simply
would not worrk. Most of the remaining initial work of training and
orientation in Massachusetts represented an effort to overcome the underlying tactical error of trying to get inmates and staff to use, understand and trust a procedure in the design of which -they had played no
part. After four arduous months, when recovery seemed almost within
grasp, Commissioner Boone was dismissed and the superintendent at
Concord was transferred to Walpole. Deprived of its principal administrative support, the procedure slipped into oblivion.
Simultaneously with the Massachusetts experiment, the Center conducted a survey of all adult correctional institutions in the United States
to expand its knowledge about what was being done in the field to
create grievance mechanisms for inmates. 53 The responses indicated
that an overwhelming majority of correctional administrators were aware
of the urgent need for such mechanisms. Moreover, they were willing to
experiment with what, by correctional standards, were startling innovations.
V.

Tim CALiFORNI

YouTH AUTHORiTY EXPERIMENT

By the time California Youth Authority Director Allen F. Breed indicated to the Center in late 1972 that he was interested in pursuing the
52. For a report on the findings and recommendations of the conference, see O'Leary,
Clear, Dickson, Paquin & Wilbanks, Peaceful Resolution of Prison Conflict: Negotiation as a Means of Dealing with Prison Conflict (1973).
53. McArthur, supra note 31.
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development of a grievance procedure for institutions in his department, the Center had a fund of both research and operational experience. Mr. Breed designated a task force of departmental and institutional administrators to meet with Center staff and identify some basic
principles or guidelines that would form a framework for the development within each institution of a procedure designed to meet its peculiar needs and structure.
Among the principles tentatively identified by the task force as essential were the following:
(1) Formal grievance procedures shall be available to all wards
and may be filed by individuals or groups.
(2) Formal grievances shall be processed through one or more of
the following levels:
(a) First level review (involving wards and staff),
(b) An intermediate level of administrative review, and
(c) Independent review.
(3) Time limits shall be as brief as reasonable to permit adequate
review and response.
(4) Using specified forms, written responses, with stated reasons
and within required time periods, shall be required at each level.
(5) To ensure full opportunity of expression, there shall be a hearing at which all parties are present during at least one level of the grievance process.
(6) ' The grievant shall be entitled to select a representative of his
own choice to assist and/or represent the grievant's interest at all stages
of the grievance procedure.
(7) The ward may appeal decisions from all levels except the independent review level.
(8) The grievant, if dissatisfied with second-level review, may request an independent review by a three-person panel comprised of:
(a) Grievant designee;
(b) Department designee;
(c) Neutral party mutually agreed upon and designated by (a)
and (b), above.
(9) Decisions of the independent review board shall be advisory
only.
(10) Decisions of the independent review board shall be made
available to the public..

1976]

WARD GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE: PART II

(11) No reprisals shall be taken against any person for participating in the procedures established.
These principles were to form the parameters for development of
the first experimental procedure at Karl Holton School in Stockton, California during the latter part of 1973. Since then, essentially the same
principles have been applied to the design of procedures in sixteen institutions, reception centers, forestry camps and community programs
throughout the CYA, as well as in fourteen major correctional institutions for adults in New York. Through its research in other correctional
institutions across -the country, the Center has attempted to validate these
principles as essential elements of successful grievance mechanisms and
has found them present in every effective mechanism currently operat54
ing.
These principles were the framework of policy for the establishment
of CYA grievance procedures. The more difficult task of implementing that policy began immediately at Karl Holton School. With the
help of the Center and its primary consultant, the Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution, wards and staff at Karl Holton designed
a procedure, were trained in its use and, in turn, introduced it to their
fellow employees and wards. By March, 1974, all -living units at Karl
Holton had operating procedures which were subjected to the close
scrutiny of the departmental research division. By tracking grievances
and interviewing users and non-users as well as staff and wards, researchers were able to assess the initial impact of the process.
The structure of the prototype procedure developed at Karl Holton
consists of three levels. At the first level, a committee of two voting
wards and two voting staff members is chaired by a nonvoting chairperson drawn from institutional middle management. This committee
holds hearings at which the grievant, with a representative of his choice,
explains and amplifies his complaint and his requested remedy. Relevant witnesses or experts may be invited to participate, but the format
for each hearing is informal.55
After listening to the grievant, involved parties and other invited participants, the committee goes into executive session to consider the
problem brought by the complainant. 56 This committee session, in
54. See Keating, McArthur, Lewis, Sebelius & Singer, Grievance Mechanisms in Correctional Institutions (1975); Keating, Gilligan, McArthur, Lewis & Singer, Seen But Not
Heard: A Survey of Grievance Mechanisms in Juvenile Correctional Institutions (1974).
55. California Youth Authority, Departmental Requirements at 4, 10 (Sept. 22, 1975).
56. Id. at 12.
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which a recommendation is framed -to resolve complaints, has turned
out to be the heart of the procedure. Success is dependent to a large
extent on the mediating skill of the chairperson whose primary function
is to serve as a catalyst for the development of mutually acceptable solutions to problems. Deprived of a vote, the chairperson must depend
for effect on persuasion; he or she cannot impose a solution or cast
a deciding vote. What occurs among the voting members is a process
of negotiation in which representatives from the two major institutional
constituencies seek to work out the problem defined in the grievance.
The emerging compromise comes in the form of a recommendation for
solution to the appropriate decision-maker, i.e., the living unit 5upervisor, the superintendent or the director.
The second level of the procedure is designed to give institutional
and departmental management an opportunity to respond to grievances unresolved at the first level. Upon the appeal of any party to
a grievance, the institutional or departmental administrator reviews the
committee's decision and, in turn, decides the matter.57 The administrator may conduct whatever investigation is felt to be necessary to supplement the information provided by the committee.
Parties dissatisfied with second-level decisions may appeal to outside
review, which consists of a hearing before a tripartite panel.58 The
grievant appoints one member to the panel; the superintendent or, in
the case of departmental issues, the director, appoints one member.
The chairperson is a professional arbitrator selected randomly by the
American Arbitration Association, which maintains a roster of arbitrators and administers the panel hearings. Hearings are held at the
grievant's institution and provide an opportunity for all parties to express and defend their positions. In an executive session following the
hearing, the chairperson polls the panel and undertakes to write the
opinion for the panel. Exceptions to the opinion may be entered by
other panel members.59
The panel's recommendation, which is advisory only, is forwarded
to the superintendent or director, depending on whether the case deals
with an institutional or departmental issue. 60 In order to limit the discretion of administrators in rejecting arbitration opinions, the CYA has
57. Id. at 4.
58. California Youth Authority, Grievance Procedures, Revised Guidelines for Independent Review 3.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id. at 6.
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issued specific guidelines which narrow the grounds on which an

arbitrator's recommendation may be denied."1

The procedure is designed to force wards and line staff to work to-

gether to resolve problems ,at the lowest possible level. The nonvoting
chairperson on the ward/staff committee is supposed to act as a mediator, thereby enhancing the problem-solving potential of the committee. The purpose of outside review is to impose on administrators, line
staff and wards the need to be reasonable in their efforts to resolve

grievances at the lower levels and to ensure wards that unresolved
grievances will be heard and judged by truly independent individuals.
Other design features included the submission of disputes over jurisdiction to the procedure itself for decision; 62 an emergency time-frame
for the handling of complaints that require immediate resolution; 3 a

provision for representation of wards at each level of the procedure by
staff, other wards or volunteers; 6 4 and, time limits that fix the maxi-

mum period for the handling of complaints and permit automatic appeal of grievances which have not been handled within the scheduled

time limit.65 A major administrative innovation was the introduction
of the grievance clerk. The grievance clerk is a ward on each living
unit who helps fellow wards fill out grievance forms, receives grievances, schedules first-level hearings, forwards appealed grievances,
tracks grievances through the entire procedure and keeps cumulative

records of grievances filed on each living unit.66 The clerk quickly be61. California Youth Authority, Departmental Requirements 12-13 (Sept. 22, 1975):
Independent review recommendations to the Superintendent or Director are advisory; however, all such recommendations shall be approved unless, in the judgment of the Superintendent or Director, implementation would:
a. Be contrary to law; or
b. Constitute physical danger to wards, staff, or the public; or
c. Require the expenditure of funds not available to the Superintendent or Director. In all such cases where the recommendation is turned down, the
Superintendent or Director shall set forth subsequent budget proposals indicating the priority of the recommendation relative to other budget requests.
Any denial of an independent review recommendation by the Superintendent, not
falling into one of the three categories set forth above, must be approved by the
Director before it is final. The Director retains final authority on all personnel
matters. The Director shall approve the outside review recommendation unless, in
his judgment, such action would be detrimental to the welfare of the public or the
effective operation of the institution involved.

Id.
62. Id. at 2.
63. Id. at 3-4.

64. Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 5-6.
66. For a list of information that is to be made available to all wards, see discussion
of Ward Grievance Information System, id. at 20-24.
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came a key element in the procedure of each living unit and the efficiency and enthusiasm of individual grievance clerks determines to
some extent the success of a procedure in a particular unit. The clerk
is an ever-present, credible source of information for fellow wards on
the purpose, mechanics and impact of the procedure.
-Design of the grievance procedure at Karl Holton School was followed by a deliberately paced implementation program that required
just under six months. The procedure was introduced in increments just
as it had been throughout the department. The first living unit of 100
wards received its training and orientation in September, 1973. George
Nicolau, of the Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution, 7 led
the first training session for elected wards and selected staff on the
ward/staff committee, as well as for its first group of mediators. These
trainees, assisted by Center staff, subsequently conducted orientation
sessions for small groups of staff and wards in which every ward and
staff member on the living unit had an opportunity to hear the purpose
and mechanics of the procedure explained and to raise questions about
its structure and probable effects.
This training and orientation process was duplicated in each succeeding Karl Holton living unit as it began operation of a procedure. The
only difference was the increasing share of direct training responsibility
shouldered by institutional people, both wards and staff, in each succeeding introductory session. By March, 1974, the procedure was operating throughout Karl Holton.
Operations of the procedure during the period from September,
1973 to July, 1974 were promising. Of the 279 grievances processed,
102 (36.6 percent) dealt with individual problems (e.g., exclusion
from a program or activity or denial of furlough); 131 (46.9 percent)
involved complaints about policy (whether of the treatment unit, the
institution, or the department); and 32 (11.5 percent) were complaints
about specific staff actions or behavior. 68 In 68.1 percent of the grievances, the relief requested by the grievant was granted either in whole
or in part; in the remainder of the cases, the resolution sought by the
complainant was denied. 69
67. See Mr. Nicolau's article on the procedure, Nicolau, Grievance Arbitration il a
Prison: The Holton Experiment, RESOLUTION OF CORRECTTONAL PROBLEMS AND ISSUES,

Spring 1975, at 11.
68. California Youth Authority, Final Evaluation of Ward Grievance Procedure at
KadrHolton School 7 (Nov. 1974).
69. Id. at 11.
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These early results indicated that the process of mediation worked
well in the correctional environment. Despite the expectation of many
that virtually every inmate/staff committee hearing would result in an
even split between irreconcilable factions, in only 11 cases (4 percent)
was it necessary to pass the grievance to the next level for a decision
because agreement could not be reached. The lower levels of the procedure functioned so well that only six grievances (2.1 percent) were
appealed to outside review." °
Based on this record, the California Youth Authority decided to extend the procedure to all of its facilities. By mid-1975, the procedure
was operating throughout the system with roughly the same efficiency
it had in Karl Holton; by late 1975, more than 500 grievances a month
were being filed by wards. 71 Of the 4,420 complaints filed in the first
26 months of operation of the procedure, 36.9 percent dealt with individual problems; 30.6 percent involved complaints about policy; and 22
percent were complaints about specific staff actions or behavior.72 In
69.2 percent of grievances submitted, the relief requested by the grievant was granted in whole or in part. 3
As of early 1976, the percentage of cases appealed to outside review
had fallen to one percent.7 4 The type of issue submitted to arbitration
has varied widely, running from a dispute over medical care provided
to an individual grievant to one ward's claim of a constitutional right
75
As of
to display politically unpopular paraphernalia in his room.
March 1, 1976, not a single disposition of a grievance under the procedure had been taken to either a state or federal court.
In late 1975, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA) designated the CYA procedure an "Exemplary Project."
The Exemplary Projects Program of the LEAA seeks to identify outstanding criminal justice programs throughout the country, verify their
achievements and publicize them widely. The independent research
organization that evaluated the CYA procedure for LEAA cited the
procedure's sophisticated design, cost effectiveness and careful consideration for the dynamics of change in large organizations as key ele70. Id. at 40.
71. California Youth Authority, Evaluation of the Ward Grievance Procedure in the
California Youth Authority 8 (Dec. 1975).
72. Id. at 10.
73. Id. at 12.
74. Id. at 14.
75. For a general review of the cases submittedt-o arbitration under the-procedure,
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ments in its success. 7 6 In announcing the selection, LEAA observed
that the CYA grievance procedure "has responded to more grievances
. . more efficiently at less cost than any other grievance mechanism
currently operating in corrections .....
The American Bar Association BASICS program78 has identified the
development of arbitration-model correctional grievance procedures as
one of three criminal justice areas it will support in the coming year. The
LEAA recently announced that it will devote a series of regional workshops to the dissemination of information about the arbitration-model
procedure.79 The CYA grievance procedure has generated a large and
enthusiastic following.
Even more interesting is the possibility of the broader application of
the CYA model to other areas. As development of the procedure has
progressed, observers have become aware that it represents less a correctional reform that a bureaucratic or organizational one. As lawyers,
judges and administrators search for ways to make institutions of government more responsive to the specific complaints of citizens, the
principles embedded in the CYA procedure may well offer guidelines
for success. Few citizens are as alienated from their "benefactors" as
prisoners are from their keepers, yet the alienation, distrust and hostility that characterize the relationship between prisoners and correctional personnel are no longer foreign elements in the relationship between general citizens and the bureaucratic agencies of government.80
The latter may have much to learn from the CYA experience.
*

see Keating, Arbitration of Inmate Grievances, 30 ARB. J. 177 (1975).
76. ABT Associates Inc., Exemplary Project Validation Report: California Youth
Authority Ward Grievance Procedure 22 (Aug. 1975).
77. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Newsletter 4 (Dec. 1975).
78. Bar Association Support to Improve Correctional Services (BASICS) is an ABA
program that seeks to involve local bar associations more actively in promoting improvement in correctional systems through grants to individual bar associations made possible
by a substantial contribution from the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation.
79. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Request for Proposals No. J-008LEAA06 (Jan. 1976).
80. See, e.g., Nader & Singer, Dispute Resolution . .. Law in the Future: What arc
the Choices?, 51 CAL. STATE BAR J.281 (Supp. 1976).

